Holbrooke on Bush's "ineffective" counter-narcotics plan

Former UN Ambassador Richard Holbrooke tackles the thorny issue of the Bush administration’s counter-narcotics policy in Afghanistan -– calling the billion-dollar-per-year plan the “single most ineffective program in the history of American foreign policy.” According to him, in addition to wasting money, the policy only strengthens the Taliban and al-Qaeda. As most of the poppy crops destroyed are in the insecure south, it pushes penniless farmers with no other options into the arms and influences of the Taliban. Meanwhile, little effort is made to tackle the drug lords and corrupt government officials who enable the trafficking trade.

Holbrooke recommends first boosting security, providing free agricultural support to farmers and building access roads to markets to ensure successful alternate livelihoods, before launching on a complete poppy eradication plan in insecure areas.

Torture of Canadian-transferred detainees continues

The Globe and Mail reports that Afghan detainees turned over by Canadian forces are still being tortured in Afghan prisons, according to governmental documents just released by the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association.

The Globe and Mail has established that the report of the case is recent, written after a Nov. 5, 2007, inspection of the National Directorate of Security prison in Kandahar. That was six months after a supposedly improved transfer agreement was put in place to monitor detainee treatment. The agreement was designed to address problems raised by critics about the ill treatment of prisoners taken by Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan and handed over to Afghan authorities with insufficient follow-up.

See the released documents here.

New Report on the ‘Forgotten War’

The European Council on Foreign Relations has a new report out calling for U.S. and European governments to “overhaul their strategies and strike a 'grand bargain' to stabilise the country.” Significantly, it urges enticing moderates into the fold of governance and legitimacy through money and other incentives.

There will be no stability in Afghanistan unless “moderate” insurgents embrace constitutionalism and enter democratic politics. Since the Bonn Agreement in the wake of the September 11th attacks, the coalition has supported the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan, better known as the Northern Alliance, which brought together the main Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara groupings. For obvious reasons it had no significant links to the Pashtuns who make up 42% of Afghanistan’s population.22 After 2001, despite Karzai’s Pashtun background, Pashtun tribal leaders were largely excluded from government and have been ever since. Many have thus aligned themselves with the resurgent Taliban. The coalition and the Afghan government must work to convince them that they can pursue their interests democratically.

There have already been signs that this is at least possible. Though President Karzai’s overtures to reclusive Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar were rebuffed, the Taliban, while insisting on a number of conditions, have been receptive to the idea of negotiations as proposed within Karzai's "Peace Jirga". The British Prime Minister Gordon Brown recently gave his backing to these negotiations, again with conditions attached, but the US administration remains sceptical.

Political agreements - like the failed Musa Qala deal in 2006 overseen by the then ISAF commander, General David Richards – should aim to isolate the “hard-core”, many of whom are foreigners, from more moderate, indigenous groups. Such political agreements would also help avoid the violent tactics that may have won NATO military victories last year but cost vital public support because of high civilian casualties.

An effective policy in the short term would be to identify insurgent leaders willing to cut a deal. The coalition could then operate a system of “divide and rule”, whereby intransigent insurgents would see their erstwhile comrades rewarded with a package of financial and other incentives which add up to a better deal than that offered by the Taliban. (emphasis added by editor).

The report urges European governments to send more troops to Afghanistan, eliminate or reduce the national caveats on their troops, and reverse their “underperformance” by increasing reconstruction aid. On the flip side, the report pushes the U.S. to shift its combat strategy to a more political one and abandon its counter-narcotics plans of aerial spraying or buying up opium crops. It recommends the U.S. shift the onus of the problem onto traffickers and concentrate on arresting and prosecuting drug lords and their governmental supporters.

Ashdown’s Challenges

The Asia Times has an insightful look at the challenges that Paddy Ashdown will face as he begins his new role as the UN envoy to Afghanistan. Pakistani bureau chief Syed Saleem Shahzad opines that Ashdown will have to talk with “the real players” – Mullah Omar and al-Qaida -- notwithstanding the recent expulsion of European diplomats for allegedly talking to the Taliban.

Latest Afghan export: How to produce opium

Intrepid reporter Patrick Cockburn finds that Afghans are helping Iraqi farmers grow poppy and produce opium, as traditional crops of oranges and pomegranates prove to be insufficient to provide a living wage. This trend has now moved to Diyala province, where al-Qaeda has a strong hold and has successfully fought back U.S. and Iraqi military forces.

In the absence of governmental support, local farmers have been unable to compete with cheap imported fruits and vegetables and rising cost of fertilizer. Al-Qaeda is apparently in charge of many of the new opium farms, sometimes taking the land of farmers that it has killed.

Retaining young Afghan refugees who have returned

AREU studies the situation of returning second-generation young Afghans who grew up in neighboring Pakistan and Iran (PDF downloads on your computer). It finds that these young men and women find a degree of strength from the fact that they are now in their watan (homeland) even though they know very little about Afghanistan. But they are open to leaving Afghanistan if they face severe material or emotional misery – i.e. they don’t have a strong sense of attachment to Afghanistan.

The report has a few recommendations for retaining these youth, since many have skills, knowledge and worldly experience often lacking within Afghanistan. It urges the Afghan government to extend moral, physical and employment support to the returnees, especially those without established much-needed social networks, improve their access to quality education, and develop a realistic and consistent plan to manage the return of highly-skilled youth and their families.

Gates irks NATO allies

Defense Secretary Robert Gates has irked NATO allies after telling the LA Times that European allies do not know how to fight insurgencies, often using inappropriate tactics and overly forceful airstrikes, which could be helping the Taliban’s cause. Ironically, as The Guardian points out, this argument is often used by British defense officials to attack American military operations.

This episode stirs up latent tensions and disagreements on how best to fight the burgeoning Taliban insurgency and keep the NATO mission afloat. NATO officials have in the past blamed insufficient U.S. troops at the beginning of the 2001 invasion for the current Taliban resurgence.

Paddy Ashdown to be new UN Rep

It’s official. Paddy Ashdown, the former EU-UN High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, has accepted the post as the new UN envoy to Afghanistan, according to a source quoted by Reuters. The UN Security Council is expected to approve and publicly announce this on Monday. Ashdown's biggest challenge will be coordinating and reconciling military and civilian efforts from all the various countries involved in Afghan reconstruction and security, while ensuring that the Afghan government is not left behind in these efforts. See Afghanistan Watch’s earlier post on this.

Pakistan’s intelligence services

The New York Times has an excellent piece on Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency losing control over some of the groups of militants that it fostered since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. These militants have now turned against the military and are contributing to attacks directed at the army, intelligence agencies and the government.

The article also sheds light on the ISI’s role in rigging the 2002 national election, and the defection of intelligence officials to the extremist militant cause.

Development of media in Afghanistan

An interesting look into the development of news media in post-Taliban Afghanistan. This U.S. Institute of Peace report explores the rapid rise of local media, especially radio, and offers a useful case study to study the development of vibrant media in post-conflict societies and their inherent fragility after initial successes.